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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

ROLAND LAVAR DENISON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs..
ALVIN D. CHAPMAN, CONTINENTAL
OIL COMPANY, a corporation, and DORA
HARTLEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

NO. 8554
CIVIL

Brief of Defendant and Respondent
Dora Hartley
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Dora Hartley agrees in full with the statement of facts set forth in the brief of Alvin D. Chapman
and Continental Oil Company, and adopts the whole thereof
as her statement of facts. We believe that the brief of respondent Alvin D, Chapman and Continental Oil Company
fairly and accurately sets forth the facts as shown by the
record on this appeal. We cannot agree with the statement
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of facts set forth in appellant's brief for the same reasons
discussed in the brief of respondent Alvin D. Chapman and
Continental Oil Company.
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE BELIED UPON
POINT I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE
JURY COULD FIND DEFENDANT DORA HARTLEY
NEGLIGENT.
POINT II
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS
NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
POINT III
I F DEFENDANT WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff's argument for recovery against Dora Hartley seems to be founded on the theory that the jury could
have found negligence on her part from the mere fact that:
(1) The automobile driven by defendant Dora Hartley collided with the truck driven by defendant Alvin Chapman, or that,
(2) She was negligent for even trying to negotiate the
hill or that,
(3) Other drivers had successfully negotiated the hill
without having an accident.
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On page 13 of appellant's brief, he states:
"It taxes credulity to believe that the accident could
have happened if both Mr Chapman and Mrs. Hartley
had been driving with due care commensurate with
the hazards they knew existed."
Such argument is fallacious and without merit. It is
a matter of common knowledge that accidents occur without the fault of either of the drivers. The mere fact that
an automobile accident occurs does not warrant a recovery
unless it can be shown that the injury or damage was caused
by the negligence of the operator. It is essential to the
existence of negligence that there be some fault on the part
of the operator; no liability exists for an unavoidable accident. (5A Am. Jur. 346, 347, 439, Automobiles and Highway
Traffic, Sees. 193 and 341).
An unavoidable accident is such an occurrence as under circumstances could not be foreseen or anticipated in
exercise of ordinary care as the proximate cause of the
injury by any of the parties. (Uncapher vs. Baltimore and
O. R. Company, 127 Ohio St. 351, 188 N. E. 553). An accident which is caused by an absence of exceptional foresight,
skill or care which the law does not expect of the ordinary
prudent man is also characterized as inevitable or unavoidable. No redress is afforded for an injury caused by such
an accident, and the loss must be borne by the one upon
whom it falls. (Parker vs. Womack, 37 Cal. 2d 116, 230 P.
2d 823, and authorities cited on page 825).
In the case of Jolley vs. Clemen (82 Cal. App. 2d 55, 82
Pac. 2d 51) the Supreme Court of California pointed out on
page 61:
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" . . if the accident was inevitable or unavoidable
that is the same thing as to say that defendant was not
negligent, or that his negligence, ,if any, did not cause
the accident. In other words, it is to say that plaintiff
has failed in his proof/'
It is elementary that plaintiff has the burden of proof
to show that defendants were negligent and that the negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of. We are mindful that in a case where
a verdict has been directed in favor of the respondents the
evidence and all reasonableinferences therefrom must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant. We
have carefully searched the record and can find no evidence
from which the jury could find defendant Dora Hartley negligent. Plaintiff argues that they could have found that she
was negligent for attempting to negotiate the hill. With
this proposition we most earnestly disagree. Nor can we
agree with the proposition that since others negotiated the
hill without accident the jury could well find that defendants were negligent because they had an accident. If either
proposition were true plaintiff would likewise be guilty of
negligence in attempting to negotiate the same hill and since
he was involved in an accident.
POINT I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE
JURY COULD FIND DEFENDANT DORA HARTLEY
NEGLIGENT.
The only evidence touching upon the conduct of defendant Dora Harttey in operating her automobile was the
testimony of Mrs. Hartley, Mr. Chapman and possibly that
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of Mr. Denison. The testimony of Mrs. Hartley is undisputed and is corroborated by that of Mr. Chapman. She was
driving up the hill entirely in the right hand lane at approximately 15 miles per hour and had her car completely
under control from the time she entered the highway until
it skidded in a counter-clockwise direction just as the oil
truck began passing her. She didn't realize the highway
was so slick until after she entered, and then she realized
that it was extremely slick. Thereafter she drove very
cautiously, since she had had previous experience in driving this hill under wintry conditions.
In appellant's brief he keeps suggesting that Mrs. Hartley "experienced great difficulty in keeping her car under
control almost from the moment she entered the highway"
and "she was struggling to get her vehicle up the hill." We
have searched the record and can find no such evidence.
In fact, the evidence shows otherwise. It is undisputed that
the Hartley car did not weave or skid until the oil tanker
came alongside of her automobile. The weaving of the
Hartley automobile suggested by Mr. Denison could only
be the counter-clockwise spin which resulted in the accident with the oil tanker and the clockwise spin which resulted from the collision.
The only possible theory remaining upon which the
jury could find negligence upon the part of defendant Dora
Hartley is from the mere fact that her automobile skidded.
It is well settled that the mere fact that an automobile skids
or slides on a slippery highway is not evidence, in and of
itself, of negligence. This rule has been recognized by this
Court and was applied in the case of West vs. Standard Fuel
Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 Pac. 2d 292. In the West case, this
Court held that the fact that plaintiff's automobile skidded
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on a slippery highway into a truck standing in the traveled
portion of the highway did not follow as a matter of law
that plaintiff did not have his automobile under control.
On page 294 this Court said:
"There is no evidence that plaintiff did not have
his car under control unless it may be said that the
fact his automobile skidded into the truck is such evidence. Such fact may not be said to show as a matter of law that plaintiff did not have his car under control."
If the automobile were carefully operated, and was
caused to skid through no fault of the operator, but due to
conditions of the highway beyond his control, then the operator is not guilty of negligence, and the accident is deemed
unavoidable. (See 5A Am. Jur. 346, 347, 439 Automobile
and Highway Traffic, Sees. 193 and 341).
The evidence conclusively shows that the highway
was extremely slippery. The evidence further shows without dispute that the automobile driven by defendant Dora
Hartley skidded with no fault on her part. Since skidding
in and of itself is not evidence of negligence, there is no evidence from which the jury could find Mrs. Hartley negligent. The trial court properly granted the motion of defendant Dora Hartley for an involuntary dismissal. Not
only was such action proper, but the evidence demanded it,
to prevent the jury from speculating on a verdict. The same
action was upheld by this Court in the case of Lockheed
vs. Jensen, 42 Utah 199, 129 Pac. 347, where the evidence
of negligence was held to be insufficient to go to the jury
where a car was driven at a lawful rate of speed on a country road and skidded upon running into ruts of chuck holes
partly filled with sand.
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POINT n
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS
NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE'.
Apparently appellant does not contend in his brief that
the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applies to defendant Dora
Hartley. If there be any question about its application, we
submit that it does not apply. The authorities cited in the
brief of Respondents Alvin D. Chapman and Continental
Oil Co. demonstrates that the law is well settled that the
mere fact that an automobile skids on a slippery pavement
does not of itself constitute evidence of negligence on the
driver's part so as to render the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine
applicable.
To avoid repetition we adopt and incorporate in full
the argument set forth under this point in the brief of Respondents Alvin D. Chapman and Continental Oil Co.
POINT III
IF DEFENDANT WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,
The argument set forth in the brief of Respondents
Alvin D. Chapman and Continental Oil Company very ably
demonstrates that if defendant Dora Hartley were negligent,
plaintiff was equally negligent. It is difficult to understand
how plaintiff can claim that the jury could find Dora Hartley negligent for attempting to negotiate the hill and not be
required to find plaintiff equally as negligent for attempting to drive down the same hill, which according to the
evidence was even more hazardous. Since we would have
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nothing more to add, we adopt and incorporate the argument set forth under this point in the brief of Respondents
Alvin D. Chapman and Continental Oil Company.
CONCLUSION
Since there is no evidence from which the jury could
find defendant Dora Hartley negligent, the trial court properly granted her motion for involuntary dismissal. If there
were any conduct on the part of the defendants from which
the jury could have found negligence, the jury would have
been required to find contributory negligence on the part
of plaintiff, since his conduct was of the same kind. The
accident was clearly unavoidable, without negligence of any
party, as determined by the trial court. Since the doctrine
of res Ipsa loquitur has no application to the facts of this
case, we know of no other theory upon which the case could
have been submitted to the jury. We respectfully submit
that the judgment of the trial court was correct, and should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON
JOSEPH NOVAK
For CHRISTENSON, NOVAK & PAULSON
Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent
Dora Hartley
Ashton Building
Provo, Utah
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